The conflict between identity and ideology

It is a sorry state of affairs to know that, even today, the people are confused as to the “ideology of Pakistan.” They do not understand what Pakistan is. They are, however, not to be blamed for this as the political socialization process in Pakistan has not been strong enough so far. Even mainstream political parties have negated “two-nation theory” many a time. 

Particularly after the people in East Pakistan took to demand the provincial autonomy, which eventually culminated into their secession in 1971, the underlying theory behind the division of united India came under severe criticism. The post-independence era could not unite both the wings. Geographical gaps divided the state elite politically, economically, and ethnically. The push to preserve Islamic ideology could not become as relevant to Bengalis as their ethnic identity and language did. For them, what counted the most was the equitable resource distribution and political representation. Given that both the aspects in the state federation were missing then, their grievances cemented further, turning into the demand of a separate state at the end. 

The religion of itself was not able to keep the territorial integrity of Pakistan intact. It polarized the society more than it unified it. Merely relying on religion as a tool of nation-building could not suffice when there existed numerous strands within it. Doctrinal differences, the political concentration of power, material gains, and territorial space alienated the ethnicities more than the religion could bring them closer.

 

Complex historical and social factors have shaped the interaction between religion and ethnicity in Pakistan, a state which came in to being with the support of ethnic groups. Before the partition, the perception that Muslim identity was threatened by Hindu dominance was more important than ethnicity for Muslim groups and political parties. However, once Pakistan was created, ethnic identity and language became more important. The state elite, determined only to preserve a unified Islamic ideology, did not accommodate ethnic demands and polarized the nation. But, to their dismay, the fact of a common religion was rendered irrelevant during the secessionist movement in East Pakistan. 

More so, the troubling question of what type of state Pakistan should be – liberal democratic or Islamic – has further split the nation ethnically and politically. Military leaders, political parties, and Islamicists have all attempted to sell their own variant of governance in Pakistan. At times, the civil-military rule has favored particular community groups to gain political benefits and incite inter-communal brawls. As a consequence of these conflicts of interest and strange alliance they produce, the autonomy of civil and political spheres and minority rights has been severely compromised.

During the military regime of General Zia-ul-Haq, the promotion of ethnic groups and Islamization was significantly apparent. He exploited both of his policies to balance off mainstream political parties challenging his legitimacy as a president of Pakistan. In 2006, General Musharaf dealt with the Balochi nationalists with an iron hand. Then followed a military operation in Balochistan, which posed a great security threat to the process of nation-building. 

All in all, religion alone is not enough to promote nationhood in a country that consists of a variety of ethnicities lacking constitutional rights such as provincial autonomy, political representation, and access to resources. It is high time the elite in Pakistan recognized this fact.